Excerpt from “Clapping with One Hand: The Persistence of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute.” The following is a selection from Akhilesh Pillalamarri’s Thesis (2011) in the Elliott School of International Affairs’ Undergraduate Scholars Program, written under Dr. Mike Mochizuki.

Abstract: Relations between China and India are often fraught with tension. One of the main reasons for this is an unresolved border dispute between the two countries; two territories called Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh are contested between the two countries along the respective western and eastern sections of their shared border. The Sino-Indian border dispute was responsible for a hot war in 1962, a skirmish in 1986-1987, and overall tension between the two countries throughout the past fifty years. The border dispute is an aggravating factor in the relationship between two countries, which do not otherwise have a history of conflict. Therefore, the resolution of the border dispute could significantly improve relations between them. Thus, it is important to understand why the dispute has not been resolved and under what circumstances it can result in war. This paper seeks to answer these two interrelated questions by drawing on a variety of primary (Chinese and Indian) and secondary sources. The main conclusion of this paper is that the Sino-Indian border dispute has not been resolved due to the Indian government’s unwillingness to negotiate or compromise, due to a variety of ideological reasons. On the other hand, the Chinese government is most likely to initiate a war between the two countries over the border, but only if it perceives that the status quo on the border is being challenged or undermined by the other side.

Geographical and Historical Background

India and China mainly dispute two territories: Aksai Chin along the western section of their border and Arunachal Pradesh along the eastern section of their border. Most of Aksai Chin is controlled by China as a part of its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region though India regards the region as part of its state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Arunachal Pradesh is a state of the Republic of India that China considers to be southern Tibet, part of its Tibetan Autonomous Region. In Chinese terminology, it is often referred to as South Tibet.

Both countries’ claims are based off their respective sovereignties over Kashmir (India) and Tibet (China). It is outside the scope of this paper to debate the validity of those claims, but for all practical purposes, India exercises sovereignty over the portion of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir not under the control of Pakistan and China exercises sovereignty over Tibet, a former tributary of the Qing Dynasty.

Both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh are located on the Tibetan Plateau of the Himalayan Mountains, the highest mountain range in the world. This region is characterized by “extreme ruggedness and remoteness,” which “makes movement of men and material, for either civilian or military purposes, very difficult.”[1] This made transportation and the development of modern transportation grids in this region extremely difficult. Even with the arrival of modern transportation in the 20^th century, transportation in this region has been slow and expensive.[2]

Of note in regards to the terrain of the Tibetan Plateau is the fact that it is far steeper on its southern edge than its northern and eastern edges; in other words, it is harder to access from the Indian side than the Chinese side.[3] However despite the topographic disadvantages, traditionally Tibet and the Himalayan region have been connected to the greater world through India primarily because of the Indian heartland and transportation network as well as the Indian ocean are all closer to Tibet than the Chinese heartland and the Pacific Ocean are. Before the construction of modern infrastructure, it was far more expensive to get to Tibet, and before the late 1950s, “Chinese officials often traveled to Tibet via India, and almost all of Tibet’s trade was conducted with India and Nepal, including the procurement of supplies for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units stationed in the region.”[4]

The historical background between the border between China and India is relevant to their current border dispute. Both countries have significant national historical narratives which they seek to vindicate by history or in spite of history. India’s nationalist narrative was based on the premise that India was an ancient civilization whose greatness was based on its cultural might rather than its political might. This cultural might was reflected in the influence and humaneness of Indian ethical and religious traditions across the world; Indian cultural influence was felt especially deeply in Asia. “The historical stage on which India had played out this great, creative role extended from the Himalayan Mountains in the north to the seas in the south…Tibet came within India’s sphere of influence.”[5] As for China, its nationalist narrative “also postulates that throughout most of its history China was a great nation and, unlike India, a powerful state whose influence extended over wide regions of Asia.” [6] These regions included portions of Central, Southeast, and South Asia, over which China’s political and cultural influence extended, most often through its traditional tributary system.

Consequently, the nearly reborn Chinese and Indian states of the mid 20^th century “reemerged with a strong sense of lost time and grievance against a world order that had denied them their rightful place for too long.”[7] For both countries, then, the restoration of their boundaries to their “rightful” places was a matter of importance and national pride, though this has proved to be a greater issue for India rather than China.

The territories in dispute attained their geographic boundaries and associations of sovereignty only over the last couple of hundred years. Prior to that, it was “difficult for ancient and modern Indian and Chinese states to assert their power in these areas effectively…this was further conditioned by the relatively limited financial, industrial, and technological resources available to the two states are various points. The costs of penetrating, let alone effectively administering, many of these regions were very high…”[8]  How these territories attainted their current boundaries was largely due to the result of the influence of the British, who ruled India, and the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) of China. The British gained indirect control over the nominally independent princely state of Kashmir, which claimed Aksai Chin, after the Anglo-Sikh of 1846. The state of Kashmir’s Himalayan boundaries were never properly demarcated prior to their association with the British, and even upon the advent of British administration, the boundary was not clearly defined, though British policy had determined not to administer Aksai Chin in 1899.[9] However the independent government of India decided in 1953 that Aksai Chin was in fact part of India, on the basis that traditionally, that area was ruled by the rulers of Kashmir; India’s Prime Minister Nehru decided to accept that India’s boundaries were well defined by customary administration.[10] On the other hand, China claimed that area was part of its traditional Xinjiang province, which had been under Chinese control since the 1700s. As neither country attempted to exercise administration over the territory until the 1950s, nobody knew for sure who had ruled it prior to that time.

Likewise, the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh was created by modern attempts to delineate boundaries for territories that were only loosely administered. Arunachal Pradesh was clearly generally considered by Tibetan authorities to be the southern part of their country; however in 1914, Tibetan authorities signed the Simla Accords with the British which established the McMahon line as the boundary between Tibet and British India. This placed Arunachal Pradesh outside of Tibet. Chinese authorities to this day maintain that the Tibetan government did not have the right to negotiate with the British as China did not consider Tibet to be sovereign. The Arunachal Pradesh dispute, then, is not a case of a poorly delineated and ambiguous border, though India’s version of the line is slightly different than the version published by British cartographers, and one that claims territory currently part of Chinese Tibet. The dispute over this territory is largely premised on the legality of the line itself.

By the 1950s, the problem of lack of administrative control over these two territories no longer existed. Though both territories were disputed, by the end of the 1950s, China had managed to establish control over Aksai Chin and build an important road to Tibet through this territory, while India had managed to establish control over what would later be called Arunachal Pradesh (it was then called Northeast Frontier Province [NEFP]). The Chinese and Indians positions are, to this day, the de facto and effective boundary between the two countries, and have not changed since the late 1950s. Nonetheless, they are still the matter of dispute.

The reasons then for the lack of resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute must be sought in the actions and policies of both countries after the establishment of their geographical positions of control in the 1950s.

China

Throughout the greater part of the period in discussion, China has shown itself willing to and eager to compromise. China’s willing to compromise has generally been related to its overall policy objectives and domestic factors. Initially after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China did not attempt to compromise on any of its border disputes, as it was filled with a post-revolutionary fervor.[11] However, within ten years, this policy shifted, and China began to show a great willingness to compromise and settle its border disputes.[12]

There is no doubt that China desires to be a major economic, political, and military player on the global stage. However, China does not seem to believe that it needs to obtain the vast amounts of territory it claimed as part of its territory, due to the fact that such land was part of the Qing Empire, in order to do so. More important to China’s overall strategy are the perusal of economic growth and the strengthening of its armed forces.[13] China has in fact only contested around 238,000 square kilometers or seven percent of the land that was once part of the Qing Dynasty but no longer part of the People’s Republic.[14]

The Chinese government, then, took the position by the late 1950s of desiring to resolve its border disputes. This was spurred on by China’s domestic situation. Between 1960 and 1964, China resolved its border disputes with around half the countries it disputed territory with including Burma, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Mongolia, and North Korea. That it did not manage to resolve its dispute with India testifies to India’s stubbornness regarding the issue.

In the late 1950s, China faced the following situations that made it eager to compromise with its neighbors on territorial issues. These situations were all geopolitical in nature and effected China’s geopolitical calculations. These situations were the international security situation and the domestic security situation in Tibet, which deteriorated after the revolt of 1959 and the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India. China faced pressure on the international front due to the Cold War and China’s continued hostility with the United States. The United States was also starting to aid South Vietnam during the late 1950s and American troops were still a strong presence on the Korean Peninsula. Combined with China’s perception of a threat from the United States, China’s relations with the Soviet Union were also starting to sour. This Sino-Soviet split left China increasingly isolated and vulnerable to potential attack by the Soviet Union. According to an authoritative Chinese analyst, Xu Yan, Mao Zedong was eager to resolve issues with India and “did not want to add hostile India to the list of problems confronting China.”[15] These problems included “grave security concerns along China’s eastern frontier…a situation with the United States along China’s southeastern borders that was highly unstable…and an unraveling alliance with the USSR.”[16]

However, the chief of China’s problems which led it to decide to compromise on the border issue, however, was the problem of its control over Tibet. Since India and China share their border due to China’s control over Tibet, the Tibetan factor especially influenced China’s desire to compromise with India, especially since there was a perception in China that the Indian government was partly responsible for the Chinese lack of control over Tibet through its support of armed ethnic Tibetan rebels and its hosting of a CIA training camp near its border with China.[17] China’s control over Tibet was precarious in the 1950s and became especially so after the Tibetan revolt of 1959, which severely threatened Chinese control over the Tibetan Plateau. Chinese leaders decided that to improve their position in Tibet, they would have to strengthen relations with any countries which bordered Tibet in order to prevent these countries from hosting Tibetan rebels and to persuade them to police their borders to prevent the escape of Tibetan rebels from Chinese Tibet.

Thus, the Chinese leadership decided to compromise with India on the border issue as early as 1959, in order to strengthen their position in Tibet and focus on the myriad of other issues that China was facing.[18] As such, China decided not to ask for any territory that they did not already administer, effectively ceding the territory south of the McMahon line to India, despite the fact that that territory had actually been administered by Tibet and that the line was imposed on Tibet by the “imperialist” British.[19] Although this was contrary to the Communist, nationalist narrative propagated by Chinese authorities, the Chinese leadership nonetheless viewed it was a necessary and advantageous course of action to take, given their other circumstances. The Chinese thought it fair to give up their historically strong claim on Arunachal Pradesh in order to get the Indians to give up their claim on Aksai Chin, over which the Chinese had a weaker historical claim but wanted more, as they had built a road through Aksai Chin, one of the main roads through which they had then had access into Tibet.[20] This road was extremely important for the maintenance of Chinese control over Tibet, especially in a time when Chinese rule over Tibet was precarious.[21] All other routes into Tibet were either from the south, through India, or over difficult terrain in China which made those routes impractical.[22] Therefore, it was imperative for the Chinese to secure Tibet and Aksai Chin by compromising on the rest of the border. Their willingness to give up Arunachal Pradesh is strong evidence that they thought their compromise was fair as Arunachal Pradesh is larger, more populated, and has more resources than Aksai Chin, which is a remote desert. Consequently, China’s premier Zhou offered India an east-west swap in April 1960, in which China would retain Aksai Chin, India would retain Arunachal Pradesh, and those facts would become de jure realities.[23] This proposal, however, was rejected by India. Further attempts by the Chinese to reach an agreement by with the Indians resulted in newer proposals by July 1960, in which the Chinese conceded even more territory to the Indians, proposing that India receive half of Aksai Chin in addition to all of Arunachal Pradesh, leaving China with only a portion of Aksai Chin.[24] This proposal was also rejected by Nehru’s government.

In 1980, Deng Xiaoping offered India a package deal similar to the one that was offered to India in 1960. Despite China’s vastly superior military position, this was yet another attempt by the Chinese to compromise.[25] Deng, in 1980, like China’s leaders in 1960 had reason to compromise. Deng was interested in interested in reversing the belligerent attitude of China during the Mao era and quickly resolving China’s boundary disputes as well as other tensions with various countries, so as to focus on economic growth, a process which began in full swing with economic liberalization being initiated in 1978.[26] In Deng’s view, China’s “international conflicts should be reduced to create a more propitious environment for economic development. Trade and other mutually beneficial economic exchanges could thus expand. Reduced tension would also allow China to shift resources from national defense to economic modernization.”[27] As a measure of boosting goodwill, Deng also ended China’s Mao era policy of supporting various ethnic and socialist insurgencies all over the world, including in India.[28] Nonetheless, India was as cool to the 1980 territorial proposal as it was to the 1960s one. Though the Chinese have not publically repeated the offer of a territorial swap, it can be assumed that the Chinese are still willing to negotiate a settlement to the border dispute on the basis of its continuing resolution of border disputes with its neighbors. Since the 1980s, China has negotiated and end to its disputes with Russia, Laos, Vietnam, among others.[29] Recently, in 2011, China also negotiated an end to its border dispute with Tajikistan, obtaining only two percent of the territory disputed between the two countries.[30]

India

The Indian position on the border dispute with China (as well as with other countries with which it has border disputes) can be summarized as such:

India: (1) would insist that all sectors of its claimed border with China were already defined; (2) as soon as possible would advance its state forces into the territory it claimed; (3) would refuse to enter into any agreement for maintaining the status quo until all territory claimed was under Indian control; (4) would at all stages refuse to submit its claimed boundary alignments to negotiation. Each of those points was in absolute contradistinction to the Chinese approach and in sum they amounted to an insistence that for India the definition and consolidation of boundaries with China would be a unilateral process.[31]

The Indian position towards the border dispute has been based primarily on the premise that the Indian position is inherently correct and that it is up to China to recognize this in both word and on the ground before any “negotiations” can begin. The root of this position is the self-righteousness and idealism of Nehru, a foreign policy position that has since been taken up by successive Indian governments from both sides of the political spectrum there. The decision not to negotiate with China was taken by Nehru as early as 1954, in which he said: “this [northern] frontier should be regarded as a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody. A system of check-posts should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially, we should have check-posts in such places as might be considered disputed areas.”[32] It did not occur to Nehru to think otherwise, to think that India should in fact compromise. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly of India in 1949, Nehru outlines his non-compromising ideology: “India is a country with a tremendous vitality which it has shown through its history. It has often enough imposed its own cultural pattern on other countries, not by force of arms but by the strength of its vitality, culture, and civilization. There is no reason why we should give up our way of doing things, our way of considering things….”[33] Simply put, Nehru was stubborn and self-righteous. During the decade before India’s independence, Nehru’s refusal to compromise on the structure of the soon to be independent Indian state in order to accommodate India’s Muslim population sealed India’s partition into India and Pakistan.

One of the issues with Nehru’s politics was his inability to view Sino-Indian relations in a political context. Nehru’s speeches and statements about China were almost universally peppered with cultural references and replete with the confidence that China and India would be able to cooperate because of their shared culture, or more specifically, the two thousand year influence of Indian culture on China.  For an example of this assumption, Nehru said the following at a 1954 banquet in New Delhi held in honor of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai: “The past two thousand years stand witness to our mutual relations…we have been good neighbors and friends and have not come into conflict with each other during the millennia of history.”[34] As such, Nehru did not wish to believe that the Chinese would not bend to India’s will given the strength of India’s cultural power. Nehru refused to see the border issue as a strictly political issue that needed to be solved, by accepting realpolitik if necessary, but instead linked the issue to cultural and ideological matters that the Chinese were not entirely interested in. Nehru stated in 1959 that he was “surprised” that the Chinese simply would not accept the Indian version of the border because they would desire to be on good terms with the Indians.[35]

The Indian government of Nehru and his successors maintained a policy of not regarding any disputed territory as disputed. Rather, any disputed territory was just a foreign claim on the territory of India. Nehru laid this policy out in a 1961 speech to the Indian Parliament, in which he stated regarding the Chinese claim, that “it is not a dispute because we have no doubt about our own position in this matter. So far as we are concerned, we are clear that this is not a normal dispute but it is just a claim on our territory which is ours, and we are convinced that it is ours.”[36] India followed the same territorial logic in its dispute with Pakistan and other neighbors, making it very hard for there to be any move towards the establishment of a common groundwork with which to even begin negotiations.[37] This attitude made negotiates between the Indian and Chinese governments difficult. For example, in late 1959, Zhou Enlai proposed talks with Nehru several times, but each time Nehru responded that talks would begin once China had withdrawn from the western sector while India would not withdraw from the eastern sector.[38] To the Chinese, such preconditions seemed unreasonable and contrary to the stated and seemingly fair Chinese desire of negotiating on the basis of “give and take.”[39] Not surprisingly, the Chinese were extremely exasperated by the Indian refusal to negotiate or accept what the Chinese believed to be extremely fair proposals. As Zhou Enlai stated, “They (the Indians) wouldn’t talk with us! What should I do! We tried several times, but it wouldn’t work.”[40] The Chinese government was said to have been shocked “by Nehru’s intransigence,” and Zhou Enlai is reported to have described Nehru as “unreliable and impenetrable.”[41]

Therefore, on the grounds that any concession to China would be giving away what was clearly Indian land, Nehru rejected Zhou Enlai’s 1960 swap proposal. Nehru and the Indian government, as well as popular opinion in India felt that Indian land had been seized by the Chinese in Aksai Chin and to accept that would be wrong and paramount to accepting that territorial gains could be made by force.[42] In 1980, China repeated its offer from 1960, for a border swap, in which India would keep the eastern sector and China, the western sector, an offer that would legalize the already existing de facto border. This offer was again rejected by the Indian government, using the same logic that Nehru did. In a 1980 speech to the Lok Sabha (Lower House), India’s Minister of External Affairs P.V. Narasimha Rao explained: “the government of India has never accepted the premise on which it is based, namely, that the Chinese side is making a concession in the eastern sector by the giving up of territory which they allege is illegally incorporated into India. Nevertheless, we welcome the prospect of the eastern sector being settled without any particular difficulty.”[43]

The 1962 war did not fundamentally shift India’s treatment of the border issue. Instead of the defeat of the war making Indian more amiable to negotiation, it only served to entrench India’s position. Whereas before the war, India’s foreign policy was based on the idealist fantasies regarding the nature of China and the blind belief that China would never opt for war and India was blinded by its self-righteous stance on the border issue, the war had the effect of changing India’s attitude towards China into a hard realist attitude, in which any compromise with China would be a strategic defeat. In place of an earlier desire to accommodate China, the policy of “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai,” would be replaced by an aggressive and assertive military policy.[44] Some Indian generals today even advocate “using every resource available to India to mobilize the whole world to oppose the Chinese occupation of Tibet.”[45]

India’s continuing inability or lack of desire for compromise did not change after the death of Nehru.  The foreign policies and assumptions of the Nehru government were inherited by its successors, both from Nehru’s Congress Party, and from the various other parties that have sometimes formed governments in India, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the other of India’s two main parties. Nehru’s policies were not his alone; they were widely supported by the Indian parliament and most major parties in them from the time of their initiation onwards. For example, right before the 1962 crisis, Indian popular and parliamentary opinion was strongly against negotiation with China or the renunciation of India’s claim to Aksai Chin.[46]

Despite being the brainchild of Nehru, the ideology of non-compromise was deeply rooted in Indian thinking of the twentieth century and resembled Indian independence leader Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of Satyagraha. Satyagraha, which means “truth force” in Sanskrit, was a method of persistent, resolute, but non-violent resistance in which resisters would acknowledge the righteousness of their position and deny that of their opponent’s position by continuous agitation and passive resistance until they triumphed.[47] The idea of persistence and maintaining one’s position without compromise was deeply rooted in India’s religious and ethical traditions, and its secularized understanding gained great credibility because of the success of Gandhi’s strategy in attaining India’s independence from the British Empire. The ideas of Gandhi, including Satyagraha have had a heavy influence on almost all Indian political parties, regardless of their socioeconomic ideologies, and his methods have been widely adapted and internalized by Indian politicians from all major parties. For example, when the BJP came to power in 1998, attempts were made by then Prime Minister Vajpayee to improve relations with China and enhance trade; however, there was no question of compromise on the border issue and the perennial Indian position was maintained: that China must first offer concessions and withdraw from the disputed territories before any meaningful negations could being was maintained.[48]

This explains the reason that India’s democracy has not produced strong debate or differing viewpoints on how to handle the issue of territorial disputes as a culture affirming the absolute validity of India’s territorial claims dominates India. India has always been prickly about its sovereignty, given its colonial past. The perceived violations of its sovereignty by Pakistan and China soon after its independence merely reinforced India’s stance towards territory: that it must protect its land and freedom at all costs, in order to become and remain a great power and in order to prevent foreigners from taking advantage of India as they were wont to do throughout India’s history. Just like India’s independence was not a matter up for compromise no matter one’s party affiliation in pre-independence India, India’s undisputed sovereignty over its officially claimed territory became a matter of national consensus and non-compromise after India’s independence.

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NOTES

[1] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 24.

[2] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 24.

[3] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 25.

[4] Fravel, Taylor M. (Strong Borders, Secure Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 73-74.

[5] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 12-13.

[6] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 13-14.

[7] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 14.

[8] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 24.

[9] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 89.

[10] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 89.

[11] Fravel, 70.

[12] Fravel, 70.

[13] Swaine, Michael D., and Ashley J. Tellis. (Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), 113.

[14] Fravel, 2.

[15] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 101.

[16] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 101.

[17] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 79.

[18] Fravel, 94.

[19] Fravel, 94.

[20] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 80.

[21] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 86.

[22] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 83.

[23] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 100.

[24] Fravel, 187.

[25] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 100.

[26] Fravel, 137.

[27] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 102.

[28] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 94.

[29] Fravel, Chapter 3.

[30] From a conversation with an official at the Department of State, United States, in February 2011.

[31] Maxwell, Neville. (“Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered.”Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 34, No. 15 (Apr. 10-16, 1999), pp. 905-918), 907.

[32] Maxwell, Neville. (“China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute” The China Quarterly
No. 43 (Jul. – Sep., 1970), pp. 47-80), 52.

[33] Nehru, Jawaharlal. (India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961. Delhi: The Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Government of India, 1961), 39.

[34] Nehru, 306.

[35] Guha, 310.

[36] Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,” 59.

[37] Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,” 59.

[38] Fravel, 85.

[39] Fravel, 85.

[40] Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan, 471.

[41] Maxwell, Neville. (India’s China War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 270.

[42] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 102.

[43] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 102.

[44] This phrase is a Hindi slogan meaning “Indians and Chinese are brothers.”

[45] Saighal, Vinod. “India Beware, ASEAN Beware, Others Too.”

[46] Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 102.

[47] Keay, John. (India: A History. New York: Grove Press, 2000), 471.

[48] “Asia Times – Vajpayee Claps with One Hand on Border Dispute.” Asia Times Online. Web. 8 May 2011. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EH01Df02.html&gt;.